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UMEROUS STUDIES HAVE
documented that health care quality in the United States is often inadequate. 1, 2 In an effort to improve quality, policy makers have created incentive programs designed to stimulate quality improvement, such as public reporting of quality measures and pay for performance.
Prior work has documented that hospitals that serve low-income patients and racial and ethnic minorities often have lower quality of care. [3] [4] [5] These studies provide an important insight into a source of disparities across racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic groups (ie, that disparities stem in part from location of care) and suggest that improving quality at low-performing hospitals could reduce disparities. Nonetheless, some policy makers and clinicians have expressed concern that public reporting and pay for performance may have unintended and negative consequences, including the potential to worsen disparities. [6] [7] [8] In theory, quality improvement incentives could exacerbate existing disparities and reinforce a 2-tier system of health care delivery in several ways. First, quality improvement may require investing resources, for example, to adopt information systems or increase hospital staffing. 9, 10 Hospitals that predominantly treat poor and underserved patients-ie, safety-net hospitals-may be disadvantaged if they lack the resources necessary to improve or even to ensure accurate data collection for performance measurement. Second, safety-net hospitals may be penalized under incentive systems that reward the highest performers because they have lower performance at baseline. [3] [4] [5] Additionally, safety-net hospitals do not have the same payer mix as other hospitals and often are inconveniently located from the perspective of insured patients. Therefore, safety-net hospitals may not get the economic benefits from public reporting and pay for performance that other hospitals do. 11 While public reporting and pay for performance have several potential benefits, 8, 12 it is generally accepted that these should not be sought at the expense of worsening disparities. 7, 13 To help inform these quality improvement efforts, we examined changes in disparities of quality of care between safety-net and non-safety-net hospitals. Using data that included almost all US hospitals, we estimated whether disparities in care have changed over time. We also estimated how a hospital payfor-performance system currently being piloted by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) might differentially affect the financial performance of safety-net hospitals.
METHODS
Performance Measures and Public Reporting
The CMS publicly reports hospital performance on its Web We evaluated hospital performance using the first 3 years of Hospital Compare data (2004 to 2006) and all 10 measures that have been included throughout this period. These measures cover 3 clinical conditions: acute myocardial infarction (AMI), heart failure, and pneumonia. Five measures relate to AMI: use of aspirin within 24 hours and prescribed at discharge, use of ␤-blockers within 24 hours and prescribed at discharge, and use of angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitors or angiotensin receptor blockers for left ventricular dysfunction. Two measures relate to heart failure: assessment of left ventricular function and the use of angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitors or angiotensin receptor blockers for left ventricular dysfunction. Three measures relate to pneumonia: the time to initial administration of antibiotics, pneumococcal vaccination, and assessment of oxygenation.
For each measure, performance is calculated as the percentage of eligible patients who received the indicated care. Hospital performance was also assessed using a condition-specific opportunity model composite measure, the same methodology the CMS uses in its hospital pay-for-performance demonstration project.
14 This involves aggregating individual measures within conditions using a weighted average of performance across all measures, weighting each individual measure by the number of patients eligible-eg, the number of times indicated AMI care was received at a hospital divided by the number of times patients were eligible for all AMI measures.
Pay-for-Performance Simulation
In 2004, the CMS initiated a pay-forperformance demonstration project in a subset of US hospitals. Performance at these hospitals is evaluated using a set of 33 performance measures across 5 clinical conditions, including the 10 measures described above. Using a condition-specific composite score constructed as described above, the CMS identified participating hospitals with the highest performance in each clinical area and gave these hospitals a bonus. Hospitals in the top decile received 2% of their Medicare diagnosis related group (DRG) payments for the condition as a bonus, while hospitals in the second decile received 1%. In the third year of the demonstration, hospitals that did not achieve performance above the threshold defining the 9th and 10th deciles in the baseline year faced financial penalties. Hospitals incurred a 1% penalty if their score fell below the 9th decile baseline level and a 2% penalty if their score fell below the 10th decile. 15 Using the methods of this pay-forperformance demonstration, we calculated the payments each US hospital would have received had the CMS implemented this pay for performance nationally.
14 Our calculation of composite performance differs from that used by the CMS demonstration project, because we used only the subset of 10 measures available for the entire period that apply to 3 of the 5 clinical conditions in the demonstration.
We 2006 . We controlled for the expected ceiling effect among hospitals with very high performance (using baseline hospital performance) and regional differences in performance (using state fixed effects). For ease of interpretation, we used these regression results to simulate differences in the predicted change in performance at hospitals with high vs low percentages of Medicaid patients rather than presenting regression coefficients. To evaluate whether longitudinal differences in performance improvement affect hospital finances, we conducted a simulation to estimate the bonus (or penalty) each hospital would receive under a pay-forperformance system modeled after the current CMS demonstration. We compared both the bonuses (or penalties) We tested the sensitivity of our results to alternative definitions of safetynet hospitals. In addition to our main analyses, we defined safety-net hospitals as public hospitals (nonfederal government hospitals), by the percentage of Medicare patients receiving Supplemental Security Income plus the percentage of the total number of patients enrolled in Medicaid, or by the percentage of total expenses attributable to uncompensated care.
Additionally, while we included all hospital performance scores in the main analyses regardless of the size of the hospital, performance scores at small hospitals may be statistically unstable due to small sample size. Therefore, we repeated all analyses after excluding performance scores based on fewer than 25 patients.
The study protocol was approved by the University of Pennsylvania institutional review board. All analyses were performed using Stata version 10.0 (StataCorp, College Station, Texas). We used 2-sided tests for significance; PϽ.05 was considered statistically significant.
RESULTS
For the 10 measures used in this study, a total of 4464 hospitals participated in Hospital Compare between 2004 and 2006. Of these, 381 with performance scores in only 1 of the 3 years were excluded because we could not calculate the change in performance at hospitals with only 1 observation; 418 hospitals in Hospital Compare were not in the American Hospital Association data and were also excluded. Therefore, 3665 hospitals (82%) were included in the final analyses. The 799 excluded hospitals were more likely to be government owned (32.0% vs 21.8%) or to be critical-access hospitals (52.7% vs 11.1%) and less likely to have emergency services (86.5% vs 95.5%) or to be accredited (48.4% vs 83.8%), compared with the included hospitals (P Ͻ.001 for all comparisons).
Hospital Performance at Baseline
Hospitals with a high percentage of Medicaid patients were more likely to be large, government, and major teaching hospitals. In addition, they had lower 2004 performance scores than other hospitals across most measures ( 
Changes in Hospital Ranking and Simulated Financial Bonuses Over Time
Over time, hospitals with high percentages of Medicaid patients were less likely to be ranked as top performers on the Hospital Compare Web site. The While our findings demonstrate smaller improvements in performance for safety-net hospitals than for non-safety-net hospitals, these differences may not be attributable to the CMS public reporting program. Instead, these differences may be a continuation of trends in performance improvement that started prior to public reporting. Without data on hospital performance from prior to the release of Hospital Compare, we were unable to directly test whether the launch of Hospital Compare caused a change in the rate of performance improvement. However, this does not diminish the importance of our results. Whether the slower rate of improvement at safetynet hospitals is the result of public reporting or underlying trends, the implication is the same: safety-net hospitals may suffer from relative comparisons under public reporting or payfor-performance incentives. This could be important for vulnerable populations. Care for poor and underserved patients in the United States is currently concentrated at a small number of hospitals, 4 and the quality of care at these hospitals is lower than that delivered at other hospitals. 3, 4 Furthermore, safety-net hospitals, on average, are already in worse financial condition than other hospitals. 22, 23 In 2003, safety-net hospitals had a median patient revenue margin of −3.0%, significantly lower than the median (−1.1%) at nonsafety-net hospitals. Even after adding subsidies and government budget allocations to safety-net hospitals, the median total income margin for safety-net hospitals remained lower, with a higher percentage of safety-net hospitals having a negative total income margin.
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Over the past decade, poor financial performance at safety-net hospitals has been a chronic problem, with margins averaging less than 2%, leaving inadequate financing for working capital or reinvestment in infrastructure and technology. 23 In addition, because safety-net hospitals serve a large proportion of Medicaid and uninsured patients, they are unable to shift costs onto other payers, increasing the difficulty of maintaining financial health. These characteristics of safetynet hospitals put them at risk for having declining financial performance and sluggish improvements in clinical performance in the face of public reporting and pay-for-performance incentive programs.
We found that projected differences in performance and pay-forperformance incentives are small. However, these small differences still raise concerns. In the hospital industry, where margins are low and sometimes negative, these financial differences can translate into meaningful differences in a hospital's resources. In addition, the small differences in payments over the short term may translate into much larger differences over the long term, because poor financial performance could lead to smaller investments in quality improvement that, in turn, further worsen both clinical and financial performance. With lower baseline performance and few resources to invest in improvement, incentives designed to stimulate quality improvement may exacerbate existing disparities, with rich hospitals getting richer and poor hospitals becoming poorer.
In prior studies that have focused on patients with commercial insurance, health plans with the lowest baseline performance-and hence the most opportunity to improve-have had the largest gains over time. 24 In the present study, safety-net hospitals were not able to achieve the above-average improvements seen in other settings among hospitals with low baseline performance. We do not present direct evidence of whether limited resources prevented safety-net hospitals from achieving greater improvements. However, the combination of lower baseline performance and smaller gains in performance over time does suggest that disparities in the quality of care between safety-net and non-safety-net hospitals are increasing.
Whatever their cause, it is imperative to address these widening disparities between safety-net and non-safetynet hospitals, and several strategies are possible. First, and perhaps most importantly, it may be necessary to restructure the financing of safety-net hospitals and provide subsidies addressing the production costs of quality improvement. Improving the financing of safety-net hospitals may require not only reforming Medicaid payment 25, 26 In addition, pay for performance could be redesigned to minimize unintended consequences. For example, providing improvement-based bonuses or paying each time appropriate care is delivered, rather than basing payment on achieving target thresholds (such as the top 10%), may reduce safety-net hospitals' disadvantages. 13 Our study documents that safety-net hospitals achieve performance gains despite obstacles. Nonetheless, safetynet hospitals in 2006 would have been more likely to be identified as bottomdecile hospitals under systems that pay based on relative performance. Alternatively, a payment system that rewards hospitals each time appropriate care is provided would offer safety-net hospitals increasing financial returns from 2004 to 2006. Such systems may increase the likelihood that improvements at safety-net hospitals are sustainable and that care is equitable across hospitals over time. The CMS recently proposed a nationwide payfor-performance system 15 that would reward hospitals for not only achieving high performance but also for significantly improving performance. 27 While rewarding hospital improvement likely represents an important step toward minimizing unintended consequences of pay for performance, safetynet hospitals may nonetheless continue to be identified as poorly performing hospitals under public reporting systems, regardless of whether they are improving.
Our study has several limitations. First, we used observational data subject to unidentified confounding. It is possible that the demonstrated relationship between hospital characteristics and performance improvement is confounded by other hospital factors.
We controlled for several hospital characteristics to reduce the likelihood of this risk. Additionally, because the percentages of patients insured by Medicaid may change with performance improvement, we used lagged values of these percentages. Nonetheless, it is possible that some of the differences in performance gains among hospitals are attributable to unobserved hospital characteristics.
Second, these results reflect changes in performance over 3 years, a relatively short time frame. Further analyses will be necessary to determine whether these trends continue.
Third, our results on differences in payment under pay for performance are based on a simulation that is modeled after the current CMS demonstration. Our calculation of the composite measure directly mirrors those methods used by the CMS, but we used only a subset of the CMS measures. Therefore, if the subset of measures we used are not highly correlated with the measures not included in our calculations, our estimates of financial incentives may be incorrect.
Fourth, these results do not reflect differences in payments under all potential payment systems. Our predictions are specifically modeled after the CMS demonstration. Other payment strategies would lead to different bonuses, although it will still be the case that safety-net hospitals are less likely to be high performers and thus will receive lower financial incentives under most current programs.
Improving quality of care at US hospitals is a high priority, and improving quality of care for vulnerable populations is particularly important. Incentive programs such as public reporting and pay for performance may improve quality of care at many hospitals. 28, 29 However, these incentives may have unintended consequences, including exacerbating existing disparities in quality of care across hospitals. Our study suggests that safety-net hospitals may be unable to compete for performance bonuses. This has the potential to have deleterious effects on existing financial and clinical disparities in performance. As the CMS and others proceed with the implementation of incentives for quality improvement, it is imperative that steps be taken to ensure that disparities are not worsened.
